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The National Council of Women Litigation ( Part Two)

Article Author –  Susan Barker, director of Sue Barker Charities Law*

Taxation Today -Thomson Reuters NZ(This article also appears in Taxation Today Issue 82.)

On 12 December 2014, Dobson J delivered his decision in National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116. His Honour held that the National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc (“the Council”) should have its registration as a charity backdated to 22 July 2010, the date that it had been de-registered by the Charities Commission.

This decision brought to a close a battle for charitable registration under the Charities Act 2005 (“the Charities Act”) that had lasted more than six and a half years.

Background

In Part 1 of this article we looked at the background to the decision, including the Council’s original registration and subsequent de-registration.[1] Sometime after de-registration, the Council then re-applied for registered charitable status and this application was ultimately successful. However, the Council’s re-registration took effect from September 2012, the date of the second application. This gave rise to a period of non-registration, from August 2010 to September 2012, for which Inland Revenue sought to impose income tax.

The decision in the effective date appeal

Section 20(2)(b) of the Charities Act allows the charities regulator (previously the Charities Commission, and now the Department of Internal Affairs – Charities Services and the Charities Registration Board) to backdate registration to the date of “a” properly-completed application. The section does not specify “which” properly-completed application. The Council filed a properly-completed application in May 2008. The Council argued the charities regulator therefore had the power to backdate its registration to at least August 2010, which would have allowed it to have continuous coverage for tax purposes.

However, the charities regulator disagreed. Counsel for the charities regulator argued that the words “a properly completed application” in s 20(2)(b) referred only to the application that was then before the charities regulator. Counsel referred to s 20(3), which requires the charities regulator to be:

… satisfied that the entity was qualified for registration as a charitable entity at all times during the period between the effective registration time and the time at which the entity actually became registered as a charitable entity.

Counsel argued that Parliament was unlikely to have intended to attribute to the regulator an obligation to “retrospectively vet an entity’s entitlement to charitable status any further back than the date on which an application currently before it had been lodged”.[2]

Significantly, Dobson J considered the Council’s position of registration, de-registration and re-registration with no underlying change “may be genuinely anomalous”, holding as follows at [29] and [30]:[3]

Notwithstanding the literal meaning of the words ‘a properly completed application’ contained in s 20(2)(b), I consider it unrealistic to attribute to Parliament a deliberate intention, when drafting the backdating power in s 20, to address the anomalous position that has now arisen. The reality is that Parliament would have been focusing on the powers needed to administer a scheme of registration to facilitate, and not frustrate, the management of charitable organisations, and to provide a means of addressing what would otherwise be the adverse consequences for charities of administrative delays within the regulator.

Given that statutory purpose, the balance is between facilitating recognition of charities by registration in the widest circumstances that may apply, and creating a discretionary power of unwieldy breadth for the regulator. Without more, it can be assumed that orderly administration of a scheme such as for registration and regulation of charities would be designed to operate by reference to discrete applications. Any prospect that the regulator might be expected to retrospectively research the entitlement of a charity to be registered for a period prior to it having made the application that is before the regulator would potentially create administrative burdens disproportionate to any enhancement of the efficacy of the regulatory scheme.

In other words, the reference to “a” properly completed application in s 20(2)(b) of the Charities Act was held to be a reference to “the” properly completed application then being considered by the charities regulator.[4]

This means that the charities regulator cannot backdate a successful application for registration to a date earlier than the date on which it received that particular application.

His Honour was reinforced in that view because he considered a wider interpretation of s 20(2)(b) to be unnecessary.[5] His Honour referred to s 61 of the Charities Act, which provides the scope of the Court’s powers in determining an appeal. Section 61(4) specifically gives the High Court the power to make “any … order that it thinks fit” in determining an appeal under the Charities Act. His Honour considered this provision enabled the High Court to backdate the Council’s registration to 19 August 2010, holding as follows at [52]−[55] (emphasis added):

I am satisfied that [s 61(4)] is a provision affording wider powers to the Court on appeal than those granted by the [Charities] Act to the original decision-maker. Once that point is reached, I am persuaded of the merits of the alternative argument for [the Council]. [The] proposition was that [the Council] should be treated as having materially the same scope of activities and pursuit of its purposes in the period between deregistration and reregistration, as was the case before and after that period. The point is confirmed, at least implicitly, in the affidavits in support of [the Council’s] appeal. [Counsel for the charities regulator] was cautious not to positively endorse that proposition, however, there is no realistic basis for doubting it.

It is a situation in which a robust approach to the scope of the Court’s powers is warranted. The [Charities] Act is to be applied to facilitate charitable works, not frustrate them. …

The consequence is that, on the view of the law applying to the permitted scope of charitable purposes since at least the reregistration decision, [the Council] was entitled to be registered throughout. The adverse consequences of being deprived of that include a liability for income tax, and the taint on its status which deponents on its behalf contend has continued, and has been substantial.

Given the overall purpose of the [Charities] Act to encourage and promote the effective use of charitable resources, an order extending [the charities regulator’s] backdating order is justified. Accordingly, I order that [the Council] is to be registered as a charity from 19 August 2010.

Impact of the decision in the effective date appeal

The decision in the effective date appeal may provide helpful guidance for some of the thousands of charities that have been, or are currently in the process of being, de-registered. De-registration has taken on a heightened degree of significance since the Income Tax Act 2007 was amended in 2014 to require de-registered charities to divest themselves of their net assets or pay tax on the balance.[6] New tax rules also allow de-registered charities to remain exempt from income tax until the “day of final decision”, being the day on which “all reasonably contemplated administrative appeals and Court proceedings, including appeal rights, are finalised or exhausted in relation to the person’s charitable status”.[7]

Following the decision in the effective date appeal, a de-registered charity might usefully consider the following four options:

  1. appeal within time;
  2. apply for an extension of time to appeal;
  3. re-apply; or
  4. remain non-registered.

We consider each in turn.

(1)  Appeal within time

Under the Charities Act, the only mechanism available for appealing decisions of the charities regulator is to appeal to the High Court under s 59(2)(a).

Such an appeal must be brought within 20 working days from the date of the decision (not the date the decision is received by the charity). This is a very short timeframe for a charity to make the decision to fund, find and instruct a lawyer, and to file High Court proceedings.

New tax rules allow the income tax exemption to remain while the proceedings take their course. However, the income tax exemption does not equate with registration. If the benefits of registration are sought pending the final determination of the appeal, it is possible to seek interim restoration to the charities register.[8] To date, two de-registered charities appear to have successfully applied to the High Court for interim restoration.[9]

Significantly, the new tax rules requiring de-registered charities to divest themselves of their assets,[10] or pay tax on the balance, do not apply until one year after the “day of final decision”.[11] If the charity is re-registered within that time, this tax impost will not apply.[12]

(2)  Apply for an extension of time to appeal

If a charity perceives that it may not be able to fund, find and instruct a lawyer to file High Court proceedings within 20 working days, the charity has the option of applying for an extension of time to do so under s 59(2)(b) of the Charities Act.

Such an application may be made before or after the 20-working day period has expired.[13] There is no specific time limit on the ability to seek an extension of time under this provision, with the Court having an “open-ended discretion” to extend the time within which to bring such appeals.[14] If the application for an extension of time is granted, the charity can then appeal the de-registration decision within the further time granted.

Such an appeal would constitute an “appeal” of the de-registration decision. Reducing the lapse of time between de-registration and formal commencement of proceedings in some form would assist with an argument that the appeal was “reasonably contemplated”, such that the income tax exemption should remain in place from the date of de-registration until the appeal is finally determined. Such an approach would be consistent with the policy of the new tax rules of reducing complexity and costs for de-registered charities and Inland Revenue.[15]

The High Court also has wide powers under s 60 of the Charities Act to order interim restoration to the charities register from a “specified date”, which may be before or after the date the order is made.

However, if a charity allows 12 months after the date of de-registration to elapse before either appealing or seeking an extension of time to appeal, the provisions requiring the charity to pay tax on the balance of its net assets will likely be triggered.

(3)  Re-apply

A charity also has the option of making a new application to the charities regulator for registration under s 17 of the Charities Act. However, it is important to note that, if that application is successful, the charities regulator would not be able to backdate re-registration to a date earlier than the date on which it received that particular properly-completed application.[16] This means that the option of filing a new application rather than appealing under s 59 is likely to result in a period of de-registration, at least in the first instance.

This result arises because a re-application may not be considered an “appeal” of the de-registration decision, within the concept of the definition of “day of final decision”. This means that the grace period under the new tax rules, that maintain the income tax exemption for de-registered charities appealing a de-registration decision, would likely not apply. Unless another income tax exemption is available, the charity is therefore likely to face a period in which it is not exempt from income tax.

In that case, in order to gain re-registration for the full period of de-registration the charity would have to appeal the charities regulator’s decision not to backdate further, to the High Court under s 59 of the Charities Act, seeking an order for an earlier effective date of registration under s 61(4). In doing so, the charity could be expected to be required to satisfy the High Court that the charity was qualified for registration as a charitable entity at all times during the period between the effective registration time sought and the effective registration time granted by the charities regulator.[17] This is the situation that occurred in the National Council of Women litigation.

Importantly, a successful re-application will result in the charity receiving a new charities registration number. The charity will therefore appear on the charities register twice: once as a de-registered charity and once as a registered charity. Currently, many hundreds of charities appear more than once on the charities register. Members of the public searching under an old registration number will find an entry recording the charity as being de-registered. The charity may need to request the charities regulator to link its two entries in order to reduce the scope for confusion in the public’s mind as to whether the charity is registered or de-registered.

(4)  Consider remaining non-registered

Registered charitable status carries with it a reasonably significant level of compliance obligation, together with an ongoing threat of de-registration and the consequences that flow from that. A de-registered charity might usefully consider whether the benefits of registration in fact outweigh the costs. Several factors arise in this context and advice should be sought.

The decision in the tax challenge

The order backdating the Council’s re-registration to 19 August 2010 gave the Council continuous coverage for tax purposes, which meant that it was exempt from income tax for the full period of de-registration.[18] This caused the basis for the assessments to fall away: the tax paid for the three income years in question had therefore been refunded, plus use-of-money interest.

Nevertheless, his Honour made some obiter comments regarding s CW 41(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act 2007, a provision which does not appear to have been the subject of previous judicial comment.

During the hearing, Dobson J had indicated a provisional view that the “reasonable steps” contemplated by subparagraph (i) of s CW 41(5)(b) could include interactions between an applicant and the Charities Commission after an application had been lodged.[19] This view appears to accord with the plain wording of s CW 41(5)(b)(i), as well as the “mischief” to which the transitional provision had apparently been directed: to preserve the tax-exempt status of charities who, due to circumstances beyond their control, were not able to complete the process of registering as a charity by 1 July 2008.

However, in a new argument that had not been raised during the preceding disputes process, the Commissioner argued at the hearing that s CW 41(5)(b) only applied to charities that had started, before 1 July 2008, to take reasonable steps in the process of preparing an application for registration, but ceased to apply as soon as that application had actually been lodged with the Charities Commission.[20]

Under this argument, s CW 41(5)(b) did not apply at all to entities (such as the Council) that had lodged a properly-completed application before 1 July 2008. Those entities, the Commissioner argued, had instead to look to the Charities Commission’s power to backdate registration to the date on which the entity’s application had been lodged under s 20(2)(b) of the Charities Act. In other words, the Commissioner argued that s CW 41(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act 2007 and s 20(2)(b) of the Charities Act were mutually exclusive: s CW 41(5)(b) only applied to preserve the income tax exemption for the period it takes a charity to prepare and then file an application for registration that could be described as “properly completed”.[21] After that, the charity had to look to the charities regulator’s power to backdate registration under s 20(2)(b) if tax exempt status was to be maintained.

This seems a curious interpretation when it is considered that preparing and filing a “properly-completed application” is a task entirely within the control of the charity concerned, and one that could be easily completed in 10 minutes. A “properly-completed application” comprises:[22]

  • completing and signing a “tick-the-box” application form;
  • each officer of the charity signing a one-page officer certification form;[23] and
  • the charity sending the completed forms to the regulator together with a copy of the legal rules of the organisation.

Given that the charities register had opened in February 2007, it is difficult to see why Parliament would pass a law, under urgency, preserving the tax exempt status of charities that were not able to complete this exercise by 1 July 2008.

The interpretation advanced by the Commissioner at the hearing also seems inconsistent with statements made in Parliament while the provision was being passed. For example, the then Minister of Finance, Hon Dr Michael Cullen, made the following comments on the first reading of the Taxation (Personal Tax Cuts, Annual Rates, and Remedial Matters) Bill 2008 (213-1) (emphasis added):[24]

This bill has three essential elements … The second element, of somewhat greater importance, relates to the issue of charities. Two things are done in that respect … The second is to provide a transition element because – sadly, I think – the Charities Commission has been much slower than the Government anticipated in dealing with the applications for charitable status, and a number of charities would lose their tax-exempt status on 1 July [2008] if no remedial action were taken. This provides for any body that currently has a tax-exempt status and that has applied for that status under the new legislation to continue to exercise that status until the Charities Commission has made a ruling in that regard.

The Commissioner’s interpretation also seems inconsistent with material published by the Commissioner. For example, Inland Revenue had proposed the transitional provision because it was concerned about “how it would deal with charities that had not completed the registration process by the [1 July 2008] deadline”.[25] Further, the Transitional guidelines for charities issued in August 2008 to help explain the transitional provision also specifically stated that filing an application for registration “will be regarded by Inland Revenue as constituting a reasonable step in the process” (ie, satisfying s CW 41(5)(b)(i)).

Importantly, the Commissioner has even recently published statements which seem inconsistent with this interpretation.[26]

Nevertheless, and on reflection, his Honour stated (obiter) that interactions between the Charities Commission and an applicant after an application had been lodged could not have relevance if the scope of applications “to which the transitional provision relates is confined to those that are in the course of being prepared but which had not been lodged by 1 July 2008.”[27]

Accordingly, his Honour stated that:

  • the Council cannot accurately be described as “having taken reasonable steps in the process of preparing an application before 1 July 2008 when it had in fact completed and lodged the application prior to that date” (s CW 41(5)(b)(i));[28]
  • the Council could not be treated as having an “intention to complete the process of preparing an application from 1 July 2008, when the product of that work was already lodged with the Commission” (s CW 41(5)(b)(ii));[29] and
  • it was not necessary to determine whether the Commissioner was required to notify the Council that its de-registration meant that it was no longer a tax charity or whether, in any case, notice in effect was given (s CW 41(5)(b)(ii)).[30]

This meant that the Council was not exempt from income tax under s CW 41(5)(b) during the period of de-registration. Further, and despite what his Honour referred to as the “inefficiency of the Commissioner committing what must necessarily have been multiples of the extent of tax involved in defending the assessment”, his Honour considered there was no scope for relief under the “care and management” provisions of ss 6 and 6A of the Tax Administration Act 1994.[31]

His Honour clearly considered it significant that the Council had been registered on 4 June 2009:[32]

From 4 June 2009, [the Council] was inarguably outside the scope of the transitional provision in para (b) because it was registered, backdated to 30 June 2008. Continuity of its entitlement to status as a tax charity under para (a) of the definition depended on its continued registration thereafter. If it subsequently became deregistered, then it was not entitled to assert continuing status as a tax charity unless and until it successfully appealed the deregistration decision, on terms backdating the reregistration to the date of deregistration.

Whether s CW 41(5)(b) might apply differently to other charities with different fact situations, and which were not parties to this litigation remains to be considered.

Conclusion

The decision is a significant and hard-fought win for a deserving charity. The win was made all the more significant by Dobson J’s “provisional view” that the Council was deserving of an award of costs from the charities regulator (the first time a charity has been awarded costs in a decision under the Charities Act).[33]

However, it is also significant that every provision at issue in the case, whether it be ss 5(3), 20(2)(b), or 59 and 61 of the Charities Act, or s CW 41(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act 2007, had been passed through under urgency, without proper consultation.

The substantial rewrite of the Charities Bill that occurred at Select Committee stage was intended to be addressed by a post-implementation review of the Charities Act.[34] Such a review received Cabinet approval in 2010 and was to be completed by 2015,[35] to allow time for the Law Commission to complete its review of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (being undertaken as part of its review of the law of trusts).[36] In her speech to the Charities Commission Annual General Meeting on 30 November 2010, the then Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Hon Tariana Turia, expressed her hope that the review “will help us all determine whether the existing legislation is fit for purpose and reflects the needs and composition of the charitable sector”.[37]

However, on 16 November 2012, the new Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Hon Jo Goodhew, unilaterally and again without substantive consultation announced that the first principles review of the Charities Act would not take place. Three reasons were given:

  1. that the definition of charitable purpose was “working reasonably well”;
  2. that a review might lead to more charities being eligible for registered charitable status which “could result in increased fiscal costs”; and
  3. with the disestablishment of the Charities Commission and the transfer of its functions to the Department of Internal Affairs, a first principles review was considered “no longer appropriate”.[38]

With respect, these reasons do not bear scrutiny. For example, it is not clear on what basis the definition of charitable purpose could be said to be “working reasonably well”. Certainly, the definition is capable of working well, as has been demonstrated by its longevity over hundreds of years. However, the narrow approach that has been taken to the definition by the charities regulator in New Zealand could not be said to be “working reasonably well” for the many hundreds of good charities, including the Council, that have failed to gain or maintain registration on the basis of fine, technical, subjective and controversial points of legal distinction.[39] The approach is having an enormous chilling effect which, to use the words of Dobson J, is frustrating charitable works, not facilitating them.[40]

Further, the argument that a review might lead to “increased fiscal costs” does not bear critical examination. Charities provide important services to the community that would otherwise fall to government to perform. Research indicates that charities perform such services much more efficiently than government. The benefits to the public that charities provide appears to have been entirely overlooked, as has the loss to the public if charities are forced to close through being unable to access funding due to a lack of registered charitable status. The net fiscal effect from interpreting the definition of charitable purpose in a manner more consistent with the community’s expectations may in fact be positive. The point is that the empirical analysis has not been done.

There also appears to be an assumption that interpreting the definition of charitable purpose in a manner more consistent with the community’s expectations would result in a “widening” or a “liberalisation” of the definition. To the contrary, the interpretation taken by the charities regulator has arguably changed the law by narrowing it significantly, despite the fact that it had no mandate to do so. The Select Committee considering the Charities Bill specifically recommended that the definition be left unchanged.[41]

Further, the concept of defining “charity” by reference to fiscal consequences is itself a source of difficulty. Canadian commentator Adam Parachin puts it this way:[42]

A fiscal consequences test frames the potential for revenue loss as something inimical to the charitableness of a given purpose. Specifically, the prospect of tax revenue loss is treated under such a test as either conclusive, or at the very least highly persuasive, evidence that a given purpose departs from an idealised definition of charity. In answering the question ‘what is legal charity?’, a fiscal consequences test essentially says that charity is a cost to the public treasury that courts should minimise. But a projection of revenue losses will be speculative … and will, in any event, offer absolutely nothing probative of whether the purpose under review is a charitable purpose. …

Revenue loss is not an inadvertent consequence of income tax concessions for charities. The very purpose of these concessions is to provide charities with an indirect state subsidy. Since revenue loss is inherent in this state subsidy, it is not a reason to withhold charitable status so much as it is (ironically) the very reason to grant it. … Legal charity under a fiscal consequences test has a great potential to be distorted into nothing more than a cost to the public treasury.

The definition of charitable purpose must not be permitted to become, or remain, distorted through vague and unquantified references to “fiscal consequences”.

Further, it is in the community’s interests for charities to be on the register and subject to the Charities Act monitoring regime. While many good charities are currently being denied registration, the extent to which rogue behaviour by, or unbeknown to, other charities is being addressed is not clear. Attempting to address that problem by interpreting the definition of charitable purpose in an overly-narrow manner is akin to trying to fix a broken arm by applying a bandage to the leg. Abuse of the privileges of charitable status is more likely to be an issue of governance and management, and monitoring, than an issue of the definition of charitable purpose. The definition of charitable purpose is a very blunt and inefficient tool to use as a de facto monitoring regime, and one that is resulting in New Zealand losing many good charities that its communities had determined it needed. The charities regulator should be sufficiently resourced to carry out its monitoring function. The development of the law on the definition of charitable purpose should be separated from that function.

Further still, to suggest that a review of the Charities Act would amount simply to a widening of the definition of charitable purpose is to overlook all the other issues within the statutory framework that are currently causing difficulty. For example, it needs to be considered whether the mechanism by which charities can appeal decisions of the charities regulator (ie, an appeal to the High Court, within 20 working days, under s 59) is providing charities with an effective means by which they can hold their regulator to account. It also needs to be considered whether s 59 was intended to remove New Zealand charities’ ability to have an oral hearing of evidence in establishing that their purposes are charitable (which appears to be its current interpretation). These are but two examples. There are many others.[43]

Finally, to not conduct the promised and much-needed review of the Charities Act on the basis of a controversial, hotly-contested and again insufficiently consulted-upon decision to disestablish the Charities Commission was merely to add insult to injury. The writer hopes that the Council’s experience may “shine a light” as to why the review of the Charities Act is so urgently needed in the interests of ensuring this important regime is working, as intended, to “facilitate charitable works, rather than frustrate them”.[44]


 

*Sue Barker is the director of Sue Barker Charities Law, a boutique law firm based in Wellington specialising in charities law and public tax law. In November 2013, the firm wSusan Barker Charities Law Wellington New Zealandas voted New Zealand’s boutique law firm of the year at the New Zealand Law Awards. Sue is also co-author of the text, The Law and Practice of Charities in New Zealand, published by LexisNexis in May 2013. Sue can be contacted at: susan.barker@charitieslaw.co; +64 (0) 21 790 953; or PO Box 3065, Wellington 6140.


 

 

Foot notes:

[1] Susan Barker “The National Council of Women litigation [Part 1]” (2015) 81 Taxation Today 21.

[2] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [24].

[3] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [25], see also [26], [29], [31] and [37].

[4] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [40].

[5] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [41].

[6] See new ss CV 17 and HR 12 of the Income Tax Act 2007, as inserted by the Taxation (Annual Rates, Employee Allowances and Remedial Matters) Act 2014. If this rule had been in force at the time the Council was de-registered, the Council would have had to divest itself of all its assets, built up over more than a century, or pay tax on the balance, further adding to the negative impact of the de-registration decision.

[7] See new s CW 41(1)(aa) and (5)(d), and s YA 1, of the Income Tax Act 2007.

[8] Charities Act 2005, s 60.

[9] See Re Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust [2011] 3 NZLR 502 (HC) at [3] and Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board v The Charities Registration Board [2013] NZHC 1986, [2014] 2 NZLR 489 at [7].

[10] With some exceptions, see Income Tax Act 2007, s HR 12.

[11] Income Tax Act 2007, s HR 12.

[12] Income Tax Act 2007, s HR 12(2)(b).

[13] Charities Act 2005, s 59(2)(b).

[14] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [26].

[15] Inland Revenue and the Treasury Clarifying the tax consequences for deregistered charities: Officials’ Issues Paper (July 2013) at [5.23].

[16] Charities Act 2005, s 20(2)(b).

[17] Charities Act 2005, s 20(3).

[18] Income Tax Act 2007, s CW 41(5)(a).

[19] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [69].

[20] Contrary to the Commissioner’s stated practice, as set out in Standard Practice Statement SPS 11/06: Disputes resolution process commenced by a taxpayer (TIB vol 23:9 (November 2011)) at [225].

[21] Charities Act 2005, s 20(2)(b).

[22] See Charities Act 2005, s 17, and the charities regulator’s information sheet: Charities Services Backdating registration applications <www.charities.govt.nz>.

[23] Internal Affairs Form 2: Officer certification form <www.charities.govt.nz>.

[24] (22 May 2008) 647 NZPD 16251.

[25] See Inland Revenue Remedial amendments clarifying the rules for registration of charities (TIB vol 20:7 (August 2008) at 10) (emphasis added).

[26] For example, see Inland Revenue and the Treasury Clarifying the tax consequences for deregistered charities: an Officials’ Issues Paper (July 2013) at [3.5].

[27] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [69].

[28] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [70].

[29] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [70].

[30] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [72].

[31] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [77].

[32] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [71].

[33] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [81].

[34] Charities Bill 2004 (108-2).

[35] CAB Min (10) 12/6, SOC Min (10) 6/4 and CAB Min (10) 35/3B.

[36] Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts (NZLC R130, 2013).

[37] Tariana Turia, Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector “Charities Commission Annual General Meeting” (30 November 2010).

[38] See Background Paper to SOC Min (12) 24/3 (7 November 2012) at [5] and [29(7)].

[39] Recent examples include sporting charities, social housing charities and advocacy by charities, to name only a few.

[40] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [53].

[41] See Charities Bill 2004 (108-2) (select committee report) at 3.

[42] Adam Parachin “Common Misconceptions of the Common Law of Charity” (prepared for the conference on Defining, Taxing and Regulating Not-for-Profits in the 21st Century, Melbourne, July 2012) at 20−21.

[43]For some further suggestions, see S Barker, M Gousmett and K Lord The Law and Practice of Charities in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at ch 10.

[44] National Council of Women of New Zealand Inc v Charities Registration Board [2014] NZHC 3200, (2014) 26 NZTC 21-116 at [53].

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